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EMPIRICAL STUDIES: HOW DO DISCRIMINATION CASES
FARE IN COURT? PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS, SECTION ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Professor Monique C. Lillard*: Good afternoon. I'm Monique
Lillard, from the University of Idaho. I am very pleased to inform
you these proceedings will be published by the Employee Rights and
Employment Policy Journal. I want to acknowledge that EEOC
Commissioner Paul Miller is in the audience. [To Commissioner
Miller] It's a pleasure to have you here again. I think that your
presence is well suited to this particular panel because what we are
trying to do here is talk about the real world. As professors we teach
theory, we parse words, we weigh burdens, but our question today is
what really happens in court, what really happens to the cases that are
brought.
I started planning this program over a year ago. I didn't intend
to be trendy, but perhaps I inadvertently was because there are at
least three other sessions in this AALS conference that deal with
empirical research. I am delighted to say that we have with us today
two people who have done considerable mpirical research and are
pioneers in empirical research in the employment area. It's a clich6 to
say that people need no introductions, but it's certainly true here.
We are going to hear first from Ruth Colker, professor of law at Ohio
State University, and then from Stewart Schwab, professor of law at
Cornell. After that we will have considerable time for questions, and
I look forward to the discussion. And now let me turn the podium
over to Ruth Colker.
Professor Ruth Colker*: Thank you Monique for your gracious
invitation. The topic for today is how empirical research might benefit
us in thinking about employment discrimination issues, and that is
something that is near and dear to my heart. I decided a few years
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law, Section Program Chair and
Moderator.
** Heck-Faust Memorial Chair and Professor in Constitutional Law, The Ohio State
University, Michael E. Moritz College of Law.
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ago, when I joined the Ohio State faculty, that I wanted to create a
data base that would look at what has happened under the Americans
with Disabilities Act' - what has the first decade of enforcement
looked like? The statute, as people in this room know, was enacted in
1990 and went into effect roughly in 1992. So, in around the year
2000, I began to ask what the first decade looks like, and I collected
data that roughly spanned the years 1994 to 1998 to see what kind of
glimpse I could get at judicial outcomes under the ADA. One reason
I started collecting this data was that I was at synagogue one day,
waiting for my daughter to be finished with Hebrew school, and my
rabbi asked me if I had seen Ruth Shalit's article in the New Republic,
reprinted in the Columbus Dispatch, on the ADA. I said, "No," and
he said, "You have to read it." I read the article, in which Ruth Shalit
described the ADA as a buffet of perks for the questionably disabled.
She had other nasty things to say about the ADA, making it look like
a windfall for plaintiffs. This was around 1997 and, when I read this
piece, it didn't ring true because of published opinions I had read.
But maybe I was only remembering the cases in which the plaintiffs
lost, and I thought that it might make sense for me to look
systematically at ADA results and see what we would really find.
So, that's what I decided to do and what I'm going to do is share
with you today some of the data that I've collected. My data are a
little different from the data Stewart's going to discuss. I actually
read all the cases that are in my data. I've coded them for various
characteristics, and later in this talk I'll share with you some of the
characteristics of the cases that I've coded.
First, let me give you a sense of what the ADA looks like
compared to the other employment discrimination statutes that most
of you are familiar with. As you know, the three leading statutes are
Title VII, 3 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,4 and the
ADA, and for those of you who want to see these results in more
detail, I published most of this material in the Ohio State Law
Journal,' and I'm writing a book about this which should come out in
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
2. Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16; see
also Ruth Colker, Letters to the Editor: Perpetuation of Stereotypes Unfair to Learning Disabled,
THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 13, 1997 at 11A (criticizing Defining Disability Down).
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 4-2000e-14 (2000).
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000).
5. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001); See also Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999).
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a couple of years.
Anyway, this is what I found when I looked at the ADA
historically as compared to Title VII and the ADEA. The data in
Table 1 come from the EEOC website. The EEOC breaks down the
data by category and types of cases. Anyone who has an ADA case
has to file a charge with the EEOC to eventually go to trial, and the
website shows how frequently the EEOC has obtained what it calls
"merit resolutions" in various kinds of cases.' I thought this would
provide a glimpse at how the ADA looks compared to the other two
major employment statutes, and the data involve 126,000 complaints
that the EEOC has handled. I certainly haven't read any of these
cases. These are just complaints.
In the first couple of years, the EEOC had a very high merit
resolution rate in ADA cases, higher than Title VII and the ADEA.
I think that's easy to explain. There probably was a backlog of people
who had discrimination complaints and employers weren't yet
6. See <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html> (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
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educated as to what they should be doing. I wasn't surprised to see in
the first couple of years that the ADA fared very well in the initial
complaint process, and better then Title VII or the ADEA. Starting
around 1994, the numbers dip lower and then, for some odd reason,
they start moving back up again in 1999 and 2000. But for 1994 to
2000, if you look across the table at the three columns, you see that
the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA look roughly similar. I don't
think those results are going to be statistically significant in their
differences although, if anything, ADA's faring a little bit better than
those other two discrimination statutes. And there are people who
think that in the early years of a statute you should expect o see a
somewhat higher success rate by plaintiffs than you might see later in
a statute's history, because members of the defendant community
may not yet be particularly well educated about what their
responsibilities are and they will learn over time as corrective action
is taken.
So, that's the first glimpse we can get into the ADA, through
EEOC's website and the enforcement data it collects. One reason I
collected this data is that as we get to judicial outcomes, we see that
ADA plaintiffs fare very, very poorly, and a lot of people say to me,
"Oh, that's because all the good cases are resolved earlier in the
process before the EEOC." I think that we can see that plaintiffs are
not particularly successful before the EEOC and in the most
successful year they're winning less than a quarter of their cases at the
EEOC merit resolution stage, and in a more typical year they're
winning 15 to 16 percent of their cases. So, it's not as if there's a huge
siphoning off effect that's happening because of all the successful
resolutions that the EEOC is able to help people attain during the
complaint process. So, I also collected data to dissuade people from
the hypothesis that I often hear.
Next, I read cases to see what was happening at the trial court
and appellate levels. Now, at this point in my research I could have
looked at trial court outcomes. I did not do so because I was limited
to research on cases available on Westlaw, and a very small
percentage of all trial court cases are reported on Westlaw. I felt I'd
have a huge selection bias problem if I looked at trial court cases on
Westlaw. A higher percentage of cases are available on Westlaw
when you look at appeals. Plus appeals create precedent and it
seemed to me that that precedent would affect trial court outcomes as
well. Therefore, I decided that I would look at appellate outcomes,
and there are roughly 789 cases I've looked at, for the time period
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1994 to 1998, that involved appellate court outcomes.
Table 2 shows how defendants and plaintiffs are faring on
appeal. When the defendant was successful at trial, in 88 percent of
the cases, that victory was retained on appeal with an affirmance.
Twelve percent of the time the plaintiff obtained a reversal on appeal.
By contrast, when plaintiffs won at trial, only 40 percent of the time
were they able to retain their successful verdicts on appeal. Sixty
percent of the time, the defendants obtained a reversal. That bottom
figure, the reversal rate, is what I tend to focus on in the following
tables. I think that's what empirical researchers tend to focus on. So
that bottom row, 12 percent and 66 percent, is what I'll be focusing on
later. What you see is a very strong differential between plaintiffs and
defendants on appeal. Not only do plaintiffs infrequently win at trial,
but when they win at trial they have a 60 percent chance of having
their cases reversed.
I decided to see how these ADA reversals compared to other
areas, and here I've relied on some data collected by Stewart Schwab
and Ted Eisenberg. My data are a little different than their data
because my data are based on cases available on Westlaw, which
includes published and non-published opinions available on Westlaw.
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Their data include all judicial outcomes because the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts keep track of judicial outcomes by various
categories. ADA is not a category that it uses, so no one can collect
data for all ADA cases. It uses broader categories like employment,
commercial, and civil, and you can get all the data that are out there,
all the judicial outcomes on appeal. So my universe is a little bit
smaller than Schwab and Eisenberg's, and there's a little bit of a
comparison problem, but it's the best that one can do.
Table 3
Plaintiff and Defendant Reversal Rates on Appeal
Table 3 shows reversals rates on appeal. As we saw from the
previous table under the ADA, the plaintiff reversal rate is 12
percent. That's not too different from the data that's available for
other areas on appeal. Employment discrimination cases generally
had a 6 percent figure, civil litigation had a 12 percent figure, and
commercial law had a higher plaintiff reversal rate. The interesting
contrast is the defendant reversal rate. The defendant reversal rate
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under the ADA is much higher than it is in the area of employment,
commercial, or all civil categories. That 60 percent rate does seem to
be a high rate, higher than other areas of the law, which causes one to
wonder why there is this hostility on appeal to ADA cases when the
plaintiff has been able to win below. Therefore, I tried to generate
hypotheses about why defendants are doing so well on appeal in
ADA cases.
Table 4
ADA Pro-D Outcomes: 1994-1999
One explanation that I came up with was that the defense bar
may be very sophisticated in figuring out over time what are the
better cases and so they're going to come up with this higher reversal
rate. What I found, in fact, was that the defendant success rate over
time is pretty flat. Now, when I say pro-defendant outcomes, I'm not
just talking about the reversal rate. Here I'm talking about any
outcome that's successful for defendants on appeal, so that would be
an affirmance of their victory at trial, as well as reversal of a plaintiff's
trial victory, and when you look at the data that way these are the
figures over time. I did it this way because the numbers are much
larger. I can look at a larger universe of cases. Basically, ADA
defendants have been doing great on appeal over time. It doesn't
seem to matter how plaintiffs reorient themselves over time, to try to
20031 539
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adjust their behavior to be more successful. They just keep losing at
the courts of appeals. That to me was a pretty disturbing finding. I
would have expected that if a defendant success rate is 83 percent,
plaintiffs would modify their behavior, since plaintiffs' lawyers usually
take cases on a contingency fee basis, and start being more selective
in the cases they accept to appeal, and that over time this would
create a higher plaintiff success rate, and that they would not be stuck
with a 17 percent success rate for the entire period of the statute's
enforcement.
People in law and economics would hypothesize that plaintiffs
should be adjusting their behavior to attain a higher success rate. The
success rate is supposed to hover near 50 percent. Defendants are
certainly not supposed to be able to have it get out of control at this
87 percent level. So, what I then hypothesized was that what plaintiffs
are really dealing with is a moving target when they are adjusting
their litigation strategies. They adjust and the courts adjust in a more
pro-defendant direction, and the results stay the same - they stay flat.
The question is whether justice is really being served. That's
something that we as lawyers are supposed to believe in, and that's
hard to believe in when the results are so consistently flat in favor of
defendants. As I said, I didn't just look at statistical outcomes in the
sense of whether defendants win, or plaintiffs win. I also wanted to
have a sense of what the cases look like in which the plaintiffs win.
So, I had to read all these cases and code them to figure that out. The
results are contained in Table Five.
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Table 5
Factors in Predicting Appellate Outcomes
*p<.1. **v<.05, ***v<.01. two-tailed tests
Whether plaintiffs win in part will depend upon what happened
below, and so here I'm coding for factors predicting successful
appellate outcomes for plaintiffs. So, of course, if the plaintiff
attained a verdict below, it's statistically significant that the plaintiff
will win on appeal since it's always easier to attain an affirmance than
a reversal on appeal. It shouldn't matter whether plaintiffs won
below in a bench trial or jury trial. They are very likely to win on
appeal. That tells plaintiffs' lawyers, if you won below and the
defendant wants to appeal, it is worth it to stick with that case despite
the 60 percent reversal rate. That's the case in which you're most
likely, at the end of the day, to be able to attain attorney's fees for a
successful outcome. No great surprise.
A negative factor, not surprisingly, is whether the plaintiff is
proceeding pro se. That's highly significant. I do not have a lot of
those cases in my data base, but I saw I needed to control for that
factor. I had a constant that I can't explain, but that's true in any data.
* Lower Court Income
- Pro-Plaintiff Verdict 1.1608**
- Pro-Defendant Verdict -0.5470
- Pro-Plaintiff Nonverdict 0.5899***
* Pro Se Plaintiff -2.3288***
* Constant -3.7655***
* EEOC Amicus 2.0238***
* Circuit Courts
- D.C. Circuit 1.8566**
- Second Circuit 1.4221**
- Third Circuit 1.4208**
- Fourth Circuit -2.1329**
* Type of Impairment Alleged
- Diabetes 1.2224*
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My next piece of data is Paul Miller's favorite, which is that if the
EEOC writes an amicus brief, believe it or not, the plaintiff has a
greater likelihood of succeeding on appeal. And I say believe it or
not because I think we all know there is a lot of judicial hostility to
the EEOC. This means that plaintiffs' lawyers spend their time wisely
when they lobby the EEOC to write an amicus brief. Interestingly, if
the EEOC itself brings the case, I did not find that statistically
significant for successful outcome, but that's a much smaller universe
than the number of cases in which the EEOC writes an amicus brief.
So that could just be a small numbers problem. There were only
twenty or so cases in my data base in which the EEOC brought the
case and persisted on appeal, whereas there are 60 or 70 cases in
which it had written an amicus brief.
Then I looked at the circuit in which the plaintiff litigated. That
shouldn't matter, right? Justice should be the same everywhere in the
country. Well, if you want to move and you're thinking about where
to set up your practice and you're a plaintiff's lawyer, my
recommendations are the D.C. Circuit, Second Circuit, or Third
Circuit, and my recommendation is stay away from the Fourth
Circuit. There is a high level of significance in rulings adverse to
plaintiffs if they appeal in the Fourth Circuit. I don't think that's a
surprise to anybody who reads the cases, but that's what I found. So,
justice is not blind, as they say.
I also coded the type of impairment that the person alleged to
see if that mattered. Some people think, Justice O'Connor thinks that
the only truly disabled are what she calls the "wheelchair bound,"7 so I
wanted to see if that is true. Does the type of impairment matter?
Well, yes, extremities disability does include the category of paralysis,
so the so-called wheelchair bound, Justice O'Connor's favorite
category, does seem to be doing a little bit better than others on
appeal. Surprisingly, that's only a trend level. I only had a 0.1 level of
significance. So I wouldn't want to place any wagers on that result.
Diabetes was interestingly positively correlated with success for
plaintiffs. I don't think that's a result that will persist over time. If
you've been following the judicial outcomes under the ADA, under
the mitigating measures rules, Vaughn Murphy, as you all know, lost
7. See Sutton v. United Air Line, 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) ("individuals who use prosthetic
limbs or wheelchairs may be mobile and capable of functioning in society but still be disabled
because of a substantial limitation on their ability to walk or run").
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before the Supreme Court." He had high blood pressure. He also had
diabetes, but he never bothered to mention that in the litigation. It
wasn't part of his case. I'm afraid we're not going to see the diabetes
result persist over time, but during my data set it does.
No other type of disability was significantly correlated with
judicial success, either positively or negatively. I thought back
injuries might be negatively correlated with success, but this wasn't
true. I thought mental health impairments might be negatively
correlated with success, but that wasn't true. When you collect data,
it's just as interesting what you don't find as what you do find, and so I
found no significant results for type of impairment.
I also coded the type of discrimination that was alleged, whether
a person was seeking a job, seeking a promotion, being harassed, or
had other types of claims. Interestingly, people who alleged that they
had been unlawfully demoted were the ones who statistically were the
most likely to prevail, and I thought about that and thought, well,
maybe that's because those are the people with long work records.
People who were demoted obviously were employed, and they
weren't fired, they were just demoted, and so I thought, well, maybe
that's a somewhat more favorable posture to be in, to say to the court,
well, they didn't hate me so much they fired me, they just hated me so
much that they demoted me and maybe, for some reason, people in
that position find themselves in a little bit better judicial posture.
Anyway, that's the only kind of discrimination factor that I found was
significant. I coded all sorts of other things like the type of job the
person had, but it didn't matter. If you read my article in the Ohio
State Law Journal, you'll find the raw data and much more extensive
results, and you can see the other factors I coded that were not
significant.
In my remaining minutes, let me turn to another statute that
most of you probably don't think about much because it's not usually
in an employment discrimination course, which is Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act,9 the precursor of the ADA. I began to worry that,
maybe, the ADA was killing Section 504 because we had this long-
standing statute, since 1973, that people with disabilities could use to
obtain successful outcomes and I found all these unsuccessful
outcomes under the ADA and I wondered, is the ADA having a
8. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). Sutton and Murphy were decided
on the same day, and both opinions were written by Justice O'Connor.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
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ripple effect on Section 504? I can't prove causation, but I can at least
hypothesize that there might be some causation. Is there at least a
correlation between unsuccessful outcomes under the ADA and
unsuccessful outcomes under Section 504? So I did some more
coding, and this was really cursory coding, but I looked at how the
ADA compared to Section 504 and I found that under Section 504,
before there were significant numbers of ADA cases in the appellate
courts, before 1994, there was a defendant success rate of 64.9
percent. Now that's the kind of defendant success rate I would have
expected to find under the ADA but, of course, I didn't. And then,
after 1994 when the ADA started to affect judicial outcomes, we see
the defendant success rate on appeal jump to 87.5 percent. I checked
that for statistical significance and confirmed that it is statistically
significant under a chi square analysis. We see, not surprisingly, that
ADA and Section 504 employment cases look very similar since 1994.
So, I do worry that not only has the ADA had its own problems in the
appellate courts, but maybe it's been harming another statute that's
near and dear to our hearts, Section 504.
Table 6
§ 504 Employment Cases: 1994 Split
I then worried that maybe the ADA was also hurting education
cases under Section 504. These are not cases that are brought under
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ADA Title I, but maybe we'll see an effect here. The only good news
I can report is that, so far, the success rate under Section 504
education cases has not gotten as bad for plaintiffs as it has under the
employment cases. We've seen an increase in defendants' success
rate, from 63.6 percent to 73.3 percent. That's not statistically
significant and so, maybe, we can hope that it will stay there, that it
won't get worse. My hypothesis is that these are mostly higher
education cases, and maybe universities, like those that we work for,
actually care enough about disability issues that they will often do the
right thing even though they might think they can win in court, that
maybe there's more voluntary compliance, a little bit less aggressive
litigation strategies by many universities when it comes to disability
matters than we find in the ADA Title I private discrimination cases.
I don't know. That's my hypothesis. Thank you.
Table 7
§ 504 Education Cases: 1994 Split
Stewart Schwab*: Professor Schwab gave an oral summary of his
paper, the full text of which immediately follows.
* Allan R. Tessler Dean and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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